A trip to the circus: a first look at the Reform of the Judiciary
It’s been a couple of days since we last spoke and, I have to say, I could not feel more grateful for the outpouring of support I have received. I never imagined that people would be interested in my rambles, nor that I would have already had the opportunity to discuss the reform with a couple of people who, likewise, are attempting to study this situation from every angle.
Now, that said, I think I need to recognize one very important thing. The first blog was written in the lead up to Independence Day, that is, prior to the official publication of the text of reform in the DOF (Diario Official de la Federación). This is to say that much of the analysis contained therein was based, on the one hand, on the proposal for the reform published on February 12, 2024, and, on the other, on the two recent documents published by the Mexican Supreme court analyzing the proposal (named “Reforma Integral al Sistema de Justicia en México: Desafíos Y Propuestas” and “La Reforma Al Poder Judicial En Voz De La Judicatura”). In other words, I spoke around the reform and not necessarily about the reform.
Now, however, much to the chagrin of the District Judge of Colima who gave an Amparo to block the reform’s publication two Fridays ago, the reform of the judiciary is on the books, meaning that we are now able to see it in all its, uhm, glory (?). The judicial reform is now a reality, which, as of September 16th, 2024, forces Mexican society to reckon with the transformations it will bring about.
But what exactly does the reform foresee? Let’s go bit by bit; and, as a matter of fact, let’s start at the end.
Transitional Regime: Skewing the Stage
For those unfamiliar with the civil law tradition, or more generally those unfamiliar with the law-making process, it is relatively common to include what are known as “disposiciones transitorias”, or transitional provisions, in the tail end of most laws. The object of these provisions, as the name implies, is to facilitate the transition between what the law used to be and what the law will be from here on out. If we think about it, these provisions make a whole lot of sense, they are intended to keep the affected legal strata functioning while operators at all levels adapt to the new status quo; something which, in turn, preserves legal certainty. As a result, however, they are often temporary and clearly delimit their material scope.
This particular nature, as has been advanced by District Magistrate Miguel Bonilla López,[1] makes these provisions ‘secondary norms’ (normas secundarias) which, insofar as they contradict a hierarchically superior norm must be disapplied or rendered null and void.
So. What does the transitional regime of the judicial reform foresee? I want to put my focus on one specific provision which, on my Instagram story, I called ‘stinky’.
Transitorio Décimo Primero: “Para la interpretación y aplicación de este Decreto, los órganos del Estado y toda autoridad jurisdiccional deberán atenerse a su literalidad y no habrá lugar a interpretaciones análogas o extensivas que pretendan inaplicar, suspender, modificar o hacer nugatorios sus términos o su vigencia, ya sea de manera total o parcial.”
Transitional Provision Eleven: “For the interpretation and application of this Decree, the organs of the state and any jurisdictional authority shall abide by its literal meaning and there shall be no place for analogous or extensive interpretations that seek to inapply, suspend, modify or nullify its terms or its validity, either in whole or in part”.[2]
Ok. So let me get this straight. This is a law. A constitutional reform at that. Passed by the legislature. Which is telling the judiciary how to interpret that law: “any jurisdictional authority shall abide by its literal meaning” there being “no place for analogous or extensive interpretations”…
Montesquieu is rolling in his grave.
Even before going into how this creates problems in the interpretation of the specificities of the reform – and raises the question of whether that provision blocks the judicial review of the decree, which is still possible 30 days after its publication (“or extensive interpretations that seek to inapply, suspend, modify or nullify its terms or its validity”) – I consider that it clashes headfirst with a key provision of the Mexican constitution: Article 1, paragraph 2 which was incorporated into the text after the 2011 Human Rights Reform. Said provision reads as follows:
CPEUM Art. 1 Párr. 2: “Las normas relativas a los derechos humanos se interpretarán de conformidad con esta Constitución y con los tratados internacionales de la materia favoreciendo en todo tiempo a las personas la protección más amplia.”
MexConst Art. 1 Par. 2: “The norms relating to human rights shall be interpreted in accordance with this Constitution and with international treaties on the subject, favoring at all times the broadest protection for individuals.”[3]
Concretely, a joint reading of articles 14[4] and 128[5] of the Mexican Constitution make clear that judges are bound to observe the letter of the Constitution and must, thus, opt to interpret secondary norms in the light of the pro personae principle when human rights are at stake: that is, what would very likely be considered an “extensive interpretation”.
Throughout this entire process, the ruling party has consistently emphasized that the reform of the judiciary is a human rights question: they lambast the observed corruption in certain judicial districts; chastise the delays which are seen in the resolution of cases; and question whether the judiciary is truly acting in service of ‘the people’.
Article 8 (ACHR) Right to a Fair Trial
1. Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.
And even at the international level, by affecting the normal functioning of the judiciary and potentially putting its independence at risk, people’s right to due process and access to an effective remedy could be at play. Indeed, the Interamerican Court of Human Rights, final interpreter of one of those “international treaties on the subject” (the American Convention) to which Mexico is a state party,[6] has been consistent in noting that “State[s] ha[ve] an obligation to provide effective judicial remedies to persons who claim to be victims of human rights violations (Article 25), remedies that must be substantiated in accordance with the rules of due process of law (Article 8(1)), all within the general obligation of States to guarantee the full and free exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention to every person under its jurisdiction (Article 1(1))”.[7]
The Court has even gone further in noting that access to a remedy which follows due process standards, one of which is judicial independence, “‘is one of the fundamental pillars not only of the American Convention, but of the very rule of law in a democratic society in the terms of the Convention’ inasmuch as it contributes decisively to assure access to justice”.[8]
Considering the foregoing, it is more than clear that the reform of the judiciary is a matter of human rights, and to the extent that these may be affected pursuant to both the American Convention (Art. 29.c known as the pro homine principle) and the Mexican Constitution (the forecited art. 1 par. 2), judges have an obligation to employ the interpretation most protective of individuals and not a literal meaning standard.
But circling back to the beginning of this whole mess, we cannot lose sight of the fact that this is the legislature ordering (‘shall’ / ‘deberán’) the judiciary to employ a specific parameter of interpretation of the law: the so-called literal meaning standard – drafters ordering the interpreters how to interpret. This is a manifest violation of the principle of separation of powers and, what’s more, an affront to judicial independence: two concepts that are intimately linked.
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In a democratic governance structure, the powers of the state are, generally, divided into three branches each with their own powers: The legislature drafts and passes laws (the drafters); the executive executes those laws and gives them effect (the executors); and the judiciary interprets the law (the interpreters).
Common sense tells us that these branches cannot exist in a vacuum: they will necessarily have to interact with the other branches in one way or another. The separation of powers, thus, implies a system of checks and balances where each of the different branches have different competencies to check the activity of the other (veto power, legislative approval of judges and or executive orders etc.)
A key feature of this system, established in the ever-important case of Marbury v Madison, is that of judicial review: the judiciary has a special place in democracy because, at least in theory, they are called on to interpret the law and determine whether the other powers have overstepped their bounds. They must be separated from political influence and the influence of the other powers; else the influencing power could basically do whatever they want. Judges MUSTbe independent and impartial so that they can make decisions based on law, and not based on foreign influences and pressures: be they from other judges, from other powers, or, yes, even the people. The judiciary is supposed to be above politics and not decide based on popular support: but based on principles, values, and higher order considerations which permeate the interpretation of the law.
The law is supposed to be applied to everyone equally; to the extent that foreign pressure intervenes, that equality is altered.
As stated in the case Rico vs. Argentina “one of the main objectives of the separation of public powers is the guarantee of judicial independence. […] The objective of the protection lies in avoiding that the justice system in general and its members specifically be submitted to possible improper restrictions in the exercise of their duties by bodies foreign to the Judicial Power or even by those judges who exercise duties of revision or appeal.”[9]
Further, as was developed in the case of Lopez Lone vs. Honduras, the Court has noted that judicial independence has an “institutional dimension” which “is related to aspects that are essential for the rule of law, such as the principle of the separation of powers, and the important role played by the judicial function in a democracy. Consequently, this institutional dimension goes beyond the office of the judge and has a collective impact on society as a whole.”[10]
To put it simply any time that the legislature, or any power for that matter, tries to influence the way judges resolve their cases, serious human rights, rule of law and democratic concerns, which affect everyone, are brought to bear.
The provision is stinky insofar as it evidences the stench of political overstepping: a party which believes that just because they have an incredibly strong mandate, they can do whatever they want, even going as far as telling judges how they must interpret a law; they aren’t even hiding it.
Electoral might ≠ right: quite the contrary, rights condition political might.
Legitimacy (in origin) and legality (in exercise).[11] Are. Not. The. Same. Thing.
From the get-go we have issues. Now, let’s see what this literal meaning standard means for the specifics of the legislation.
The nitty-gritty: a look at the judicial reform Pt 1
For this section I will do my best to summarize some of the important points of the judicial reform: leaving the novel Organo de Administraación and Tribunal de Diciplina, certain procedural changes especially with regards to Amparos, and other smaller elements for another post; else we would once again be reaching the 7000-word mark from last time. For those that are interested, I have created a document that highlights the old and new drafting of the Mexican constitution which served as the base for this blog which I am happy to relay via Instagram or Email.
Without further ado, let’s go to the circus.[12]
Some good…
Taken from @les_iju: https://www.instagram.com/les_iju/?hl=en
When reading the text of the constitutional reform I noticed a small but, in my opinion, very important change to the letter of the law: referring explicitly to las ministras, las juezas, and las senadoras/diputadas – though, unfortunately from my perspective, not consistently using the term personas juzgadoras is rather disheartening especially in the light of the literal meaning standard. In the masterful musical by Lin Manuel Miranda, Hamilton, Angelica Schyler has a line that, on top of being badass, reflects a seriously tragic reality: “"We hold these truths to be self-evident, That all men are created equal"; And when I meet Thomas Jefferson; I'm 'a compel him to include women in the sequel! (Work!)”.
For too long have women been excluded from explicit constitutional recognition. And as much as people will want to say, “oh, man or mankind is capable of recognizing both men and women” (also conveniently ignoring those that do not fit those categories) it is undeniable that giving constitutional recognition, however small, to a group that represents roughly 50% of the population, is important and worthy of celebration. On this front, I would encourage people to read into the academic literature surrounding the symbolic effects of female representation in the footnotes (I am not as well read in it as I probably should, but it’s the collection that has formed the backbone of my position on the matter).[13]
So there, a flower to the constitutional reform.
Popular election of Justices: getting on the ballot, the process, and the reelections
As the big tamale of the judicial reform, we will go by sections. First article 95. To even be put on the ballot judges must fulfil, primordially, one novel requirement: to, at the time of the publication of the ballot procedure, have at least 5 years professional experience with a minimum GPA of 8 and a GPA of 9 in relevant subjects.[14]
Under the old system, however, to be appointed it was necessary for the individual be at least 35 years old[15] and to have had their professional law license (título profesional de licenciado en derecho) for at least 10 years. The first being suppressed, and the second being replaced by what I mentioned prior. I’ll be exploring some of the problems I see with this specific point at a later date.
For now, however, I want to direct my attention to what was removed from article 95: “The appointments of the Ministros shall preferably be made from among those persons who have served with efficiency, capacity and probity in the administration of justice or who have distinguished themselves for their honorability, competence and professional background in the practice of law.”[16]
Odd thing to remove, no? I assume that the legislators are operating under the assumption that good grades make you an honorable, competent, and distinguished lawyer; personally, I’m not sure if I buy that…
Let’s keep going…
The novel drafting of article 96 establishes the constitutional framework that will govern the direct election of judges.[17] This process begins with the call for the integration of the list of candidacies which is to be published thirty calendar days following the initiation of the first regular session of the judiciary of the year preceding the election: this call is to include every stage of the procedure, relevant dates and deadlines, and the positions to be elected.[18]
Each of the branches of government will then nominate individuals to be on the ballot, with each power having the right to nominate a different number of candidates depending on the vacancy to be filled:
When it comes to Ministers of the SCJN, Magistrates of the Superior Chamber of the Electoral Tribunal and members of the Judicial Disciplinary Tribunal who will be elected at the national level:[19] Each power will have the right to nominate three individuals.
When it comes to Circuit Magistrates and District Judges who will be elected based on the judicial circuit (which seems like a circumscription):[20] Each power will have the right to nominate two individuals.
Now, as much as some conservatives may try to say that there is no screening of these individuals, there is one: it’s just really, really, really odd.
Individuals interested in forming a part of the selection procedure must, aside from fulfilling the article 95 requirements, “submit a three-page essay justifying the reasons for their nomination and submit five letters of reference from neighbors, colleagues or persons who support their suitability for the position.”[21] All due respect to my neighbor, lovely woman might I add, but I’m not so sure that they may be the best person to choose who is and is not qualified to be a judge. Also, friends and colleagues, all of us have at some point in our lives received a letter of recommendation from a person we would consider a friend: do they really see us objectively, or does the tint of comradery and friendship make them see us as more competent than we are? And are we forgetting that organized crime is a thing in Mexico?? Is this not yet another method for powers of fact to influence the proper functioning of government? Hmmm. I wonder.
After you submit these things, the candidacies will be analyzed by Evaluation Committees created by each of the three branches of government[22] composed of 5 persons of “recognized in the legal field”: not highly recognized, not of the highest honorability and distinction, not what under Spanish law they call “Abogados de reconocido prestigio”. No. Just recognized. These groups will then select the 10 most ideal candidates in the case of nationally elected positions and 6 in the case of positions elected at the circuit level for each roll which, after a public curation proceeding and approval by the Senate, will be the Judicial Candidates.[23]
Now as far as the how the election will look like there are a lot of open questions. It’s clear that the National Electoral Institute (INE) will be the body tasked with organizing the election.[24] But, following the letter of the text, there is a clear remission to secondary legislation (reserva de ley) “The law shall establish the form of the campaigns, as well as the restrictions and sanctions applicable to candidates or public servants whose manifestations or proposals exceed or contravene constitutional and legal parameters.”[25]
Right now, we only have three clear elements:
Candidates must have egalitarian access to radio and tv channels, with the time allotments established by secondary legislation. And will, further, be allowed to participate in debates organized by, either, the National Electoral Institute, or, and I quote, “those provided free of charge by the public, private or social sector under equitable conditions.”[26] I see. So, a campaign will happen then huh. I think I ranted on this point enough on the last post, so I’ll just leave this here.
No public or private financing of any kind is permitted. Further candidates are not allowed to buy, in their own name or through an intermediary, campaign ads to be played in any media space (on that point, I wonder if social media is included). And finally, political parties and public servants are not allowed to promote any one candidate. Though, on its face, this doesn’t look too bad, let us not forget the violent amounts of money originating from organized crime in legislative elections. Gee, who would have thought that external interests would have a new avenue to influence politics if we replicate the mechanism that is used to elect the legislature. It’s not like the legislature is corrupt; no no no, just being elected popularly makes them ipso facto virtuous… Sarcasm aside. A campaign costs money, and that money needs to come from somewhere: the legislature’s poetry may have their head too far up in the clouds to see the Mexican realty.[27]
And finally, that the campaigns will last a total of 60 days, with pre-campaigns being explicitly prohibited. Yup. That’s it.[28]
The last thing that is important to note about the reforms is the timespans for each different post and whether they can be reelected; for the time being we won’t talk about the novel Disciplinary Tribunal since I think that deserves a post unto itself (but, just as a preview, their decisions are not subject to appeal):[29]
The Jes is intentional, don't come at me
Pursuant to the transitional regime this process will be rolled out in two phases: the first in 2025, and then, by 2027, the idea is that every member of the judiciary will be sitting in their seat based on a popular election.
Further, the federal level is just the beginning, since article 116 basically foresees this model being replicated at the level of the States: in other words, it won’t just be the 1663 members of the federal judiciary that have to be popularly elected[30] but potentially thousands more members of state judiciaries which will also have to be elected.
This number is insane, and seriously begs the question: How is an average citizen going to be able to keep up with national, circuit, and state judicial elections on top of the legislative and executive elections at the federal and state level? That’s a lot of candidates people have to be informed about; unless we don’t care about them being informed in which case I have more questions…
On verra (we’ll see).
Bottlenecking the Supreme Court
Next, the Mexican Supreme Court (SCJN). The novel drafting of article 94 of the constitution also has some elements which, from both a practical and legal perspective, present issues. The primary changes are summarized in the table below:[31]
I will address some of the more specific issues that I see with affecting the salary and retirement contributions in a subsequent post,[32] but right now I want to focus on two concrete elements: the very serious practical problems these changes bring about; and the more concretely interpretative elements that are at play.
First: the elimination of the chambers (Salas). These chambers have been in existence since at least the 1950s and have been a key feature in transforming the SCJN into a true Constitutional Court. Indeed, it is the chambers that resolve around 75% of all cases that reach the SCJN given that they discuss in private and only vote publicly.[33] Now, however, not only will every case that reaches the SCJN have to be resolved in a plenary session, but these plenary sessions will have to be public (remember literal meaning).
The problem here is clear: how the hell is the pleno of the SCJN going to be able to resolve the 75% cases that the chambers used to solve? One way or another there are going to be massive delays in the administration of justice which, by its own admission, was one of the key aims of the reform. So. There’s that.
And second: I want to remind everyone of the transitional provision we discussed earlier – literal meaning–. Despite foreseeing a rather in-depth Exceptional Election regime, nowhere in the transitional clauses is there a mention of the interim composition of the SCJN, nor of the minimum number of votes to make obligatory jurisprudence. Right now, we are still functionally operating under the old model of 11 Ministros/Ministras, which functionally means - under a literal meaning reading - that the minimum number of votes to annul a law would go from 8 to 6 which, of course, has implications on the rapid-fire legislative efforts MORENA has been pushing (and will continue to push) in the coming months. The former especially bearing in mind the upcoming retirement of Ministro Luis María Aguilar this upcoming November 30th.[34]
This lack of legal certainty begs a bunch of rather obvious questions: if the opposition wishes to impugn the decree within the allotted 30 days, what will be the minimum number of votes to declare its invalidity? Is that even possible considering there is “no place for analogous or extensive interpretations that seek to inapply, suspend, modify or nullify its terms or its validity, either in whole or in part”?
In this sea of ambiguity, it may well be that certain unconstitutional laws slip through the cracks because of the terrible drafting of this transitional clause. I don’t tend to enjoy attributing to malice what can otherwise be attributed to incompetence, but something smells off.
Faceless Judges
Another rather concerning addition is the one seen in the added paragraph of article 20.1.A.X which foresees the possibility of employing the “necessary measures” to preserve the security “and identity” of judicial operators in organized crime cases.[35] Though there is no indication as to what these necessary measures may be, both the President Lopez Obrador and incoming president Sheinbaum have shown a willingness to have “Faceless Judges” (Jueces sin Rostro).[36]
Though in a lot of areas with the judicial reform we are exploring untread waters we’ve seen this story before. In the case of J vs. Peru the IACtHR reiterated that “‘faceless’ or ‘secret’ judges violate Article 8(1) of the American Convention, because they prevent the accused from knowing the identity of the judges and, consequently, from assessing their aptness and competence, as well as from determining if there are reasons to recuse them, so that they can exercise their defense before an independent and impartial court.”[37]
I’m not sure there is much else to say.
Conclusion, for now…
As may be intuited from this first look at the reform, there are a lot of open questions, and a lot of outright problems. What is for sure, however, is that secondary legislation will be the key area where the nature (good or bad) of the reform will be defined. That is where the fight continues.
I write this post in English because I call on the international community to speak up about this problem: judicial reforms have been a frequent part of the platform of democratically questionable leaders (Hungary and Poland being good European examples; and Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela being good historical Latin-American examples). And, as much as I may hate to admit it, diplomatic pressure plays a huge role in these types of things.
So, for now, we wait; but not sitting on our hands. We have a duty to speak out and point out exactly what is wrong with the reform as we see it. Some may say “stop crying it’s a reality, now we have to deal with it”. Fine. You do you. But I believe that there are fellow democrats out there that believe that by raising our voices we can fight this change, at least, in the court of public opinion.
Borrowing the words of the great Lin Manuel Miranda: history has its eyes on us; let’s not throw away our shot!
[1] See here for a breakdown of his argumentation: https://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/analisis-de-la-reforma-judicial-alertan-de-aplicacion-literal-de-las-normas/1674152
[2] Own translation.
[3] Own translation.
[4] “en los juicios del orden civil, la sentencia definitiva deberá ser conforme a la letra o a la interpretación jurídica de la ley, y a falta de ésta se fundará en los principios generales del derecho”.
[5] “Todo funcionario público, sin excepción alguna, antes de tomar posesión de su encargo, prestará la protesta de guardar la Constitución y las leyes que de ella emanen”
[6] Having, further, accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the Court.
[7] Caso Pueblo Indígena Kichwa de Sarayaku Vs. Ecuador Serie C No. 245, § 260, Caso Goiburú y otros Vs. Paraguay Serie C No. 153, § 110, Caso Trabajadores Cesados del Congreso (Aguado Alfaro y otros) Vs. Perú Serie C No. 158, § 106, Caso Usón Ramírez Vs. Venezuela Serie C No. 207, § 128, Caso Cruz Sánchez y otros Vs. Perú Serie C No. 292, § 346, Caso Comunidad Indígena Yakye Axa Vs. Paraguay Serie C No. 125, § 62, Caso Miembros de la Aldea Chichupac y comunidades vecinas del Municipio de Rabinal Vs. Guatemala Serie C No. 328, Caso Yarce y otras Vs. Colombia Serie C No. 325, Caso Fairén Garbi y Solís Corrales Vs. Honduras Serie C No. 2, § 90, Caso González Medina y familiares Vs. República Dominicana Serie C No. 240, § 207, Caso de la Comunidad Moiwana Vs. Surinam Serie C No. 124, § 142, Caso Chinchilla Sandoval y otros Vs. Guatemala Serie C No. 312, § 233, Caso Velásquez Rodríguez Vs. Honduras Serie C No. 1, § 91, Caso Defensor de Derechos Humanos y otros Vs. Guatemala Serie C No. 283, § 199, Caso de las Hermanas Serrano Cruz Vs. El Salvador Serie C No. 120, § 76, Caso Gudiel Álvarez y otros ("Diario Militar") Vs. Guatemala Serie C No. 253, § 229, Caso Masacre de Santo Domingo Vs. Colombia Serie C No. 259, § 155, Caso Comunidades Indígenas Miembros de la Asociación Lhaka Honhat (Nuestra Tierra) Vs. Argentina Serie C No. 400, Caso Fleury y otros Vs. Haití Serie C No. 236, § 105, Caso Anzualdo Castro Vs. Perú Serie C No. 202, § 122, Document A No. 9 Serie A No. 9, § 24, Caso Las Palmeras Vs. Colombia Serie C No. 90, § 60, Caso Yvon Neptune Vs. Haití Serie C No. 180, § 77, Caso de la Masacre de Las Dos Erres Vs. Guatemala Serie C No. 211, § 104, Caso Vera Vera y otra Vs. Ecuador Serie C No. 226, § 86, Caso Masacres de El Mozote y lugares aledaños Vs. El Salvador Serie C No. 252, § 242, Caso Acosta y otros Vs. Nicaragua Serie C No. 334, § 131, Caso Galindo Cárdenas y otros Vs. Perú Serie C No. 301, § 258, Caso Roche Azaña y otros Vs. Nicaragua Serie C No. 403, § 84, Caso 19 Comerciantes Vs. Colombia Serie C No. 109, § 194, Caso Godínez Cruz Vs. Honduras Serie C No. 5, § 65, Caso Luna López Vs. Honduras Serie C No. 269, § 154, Caso Ximenes Lopes Vs. Brasil Serie C No. 149, § 175, Caso Zambrano Vélez y otros Vs. Ecuador Serie C No. 166, § 114, Caso de la Masacre de La Rochela Vs. Colombia Serie C No. 163, § 145, Caso de las Masacres de Ituango Vs. Colombia Serie C No. 148, § 287, Caso Baldeón García Vs. Perú Serie C No. 147, Caso de la Masacre de Pueblo Bello Vs. Colombia Serie C No. 140, § 169, Caso Claude Reyes y otros Vs. Chile Serie C No. 151, § 127, Caso Palamara Iribarne Vs. Chile Serie C No. 135, § 163, Caso V.R.P., V.P.C. y otros Vs. Nicaragua Serie C No. 350, § 150, Caso Guzmán Albarracín y otras Vs. Ecuador Serie C No. 405, § 176, Caso Comunidad Campesina de Santa Bárbara Vs. Perú Serie C No. 299, § 216, Caso Favela Nova Brasília Vs. Brasil Serie C No. 333, § 174, Caso Gutiérrez Hernández y otros Vs. Guatemala Serie C No. 339, § 147, Caso Duque Vs. Colombia Serie C No. 310, § 145, Caso Pueblos Kaliña y Lokono Vs. Surinam Serie C No. 309, § 237, Caso Comunidad Garífuna de Punta Piedra y sus miembros Vs. Honduras Serie C No. 304, § 231, Caso I.V. Vs. Bolivia Serie C No. 329, § 292, Caso Comunidad Garífuna Triunfo de la Cruz y sus miembros Vs. Honduras Serie C No. 305, § 226, Caso Godínez Cruz Vs. Honduras Serie C No. 3, § 93, Caso Salvador Chiriboga Vs. Ecuador Serie C No. 179, § 58, Caso Cabrera García y Montiel Flores Vs. México Serie C No. 220, § 141, Caso Maldonado Vargas y otros Vs. Chile Serie C No. 300, § 75, Caso Hermanos Landaeta Mejías y otros Vs. Venezuela Serie C No. 281, § 215, Caso Gutiérrez y familia Vs. Argentina Serie C No. 271, § 97, Caso Mendoza y otros Vs. Argentina Serie C No. 260, § 217, Caso García y familiares Vs. Guatemala Serie C No. 258, § 129, Caso Torres Millacura y otros Vs. Argentina Serie C No. 229, § 113, Caso Ibsen Cárdenas e Ibsen Peña Vs. Bolivia Serie C No. 217, § 151, Caso Velásquez Paiz y otros Vs. Guatemala Serie C No. 307, § 142, Caso Chitay Nech y otros Vs. Guatemala Serie C No. 212, § 190, Caso Kawas Fernández Vs. Honduras Serie C No. 196, § 110, Caso Radilla Pacheco Vs. México Serie C No. 209, § 190, Caso Castañeda Gutman Vs. México Serie C No. 184, § 34, Caso Mohamed Vs. Argentina Serie C No. 255, § 82, Caso García Lucero y otras Vs. Chile Serie C No. 267, § 182, Caso Masacres de Río Negro Vs. Guatemala Serie C No. 250, Caso Cantoral Huamaní y García Santa Cruz Vs. Perú Serie C No. 167, § 124, Caso del Penal Miguel Castro Castro Vs. Perú Serie C No. 160, § 381, Caso de la "Masacre de Mapiripán" Vs. Colombia Serie C No. 134, § 195, Caso García Ibarra y otros Vs. Ecuador Serie C No. 306, § 131
[8] Blake Vs. Guatemala Serie C No. 48, § 63
[9] Caso Rico Vs. Argentina Serie C No. 383, § 53
[10] Caso López Lone y otros Vs. Honduras Serie C No. 302, § 192, 194
[11] Article 3 Interamerican Democratic Charter.
[12] *Insert clown song*
[13] Doornkamp, L., Groeneveld, S., Groeneveld, M. G., Van der Pol, L. D., & Mesman, J. (2022). Understanding the Symbolic Effects of Gender Representation: A Multi-Source Study in Education. International Public Management Journal, 26(6), 829–851. https://doi.org/10.1080/10967494.2021.1991534; ESPÍRITO-SANTO, Ana, The symbolic value of descriptive representation : the case of female representation, Florence: European University Institute, 2011, EUI, SPS, PhD Thesis https://hdl.handle.net/1814/20062; Burnet JE. Women Have Found Respect: Gender Quotas, Symbolic Representation, and Female Empowerment in Rwanda. Politics & Gender. 2011;7(3):303-334. doi:10.1017/S1743923X11000250; Childs, S., & Krook, M. L. (2006). Gender and Politics: The State of the Art. Politics, 26(1), 18-28. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2006.00247.x; Paxton, Pamela, Sheri Kunovich, and Melanie M. Hughes. "Gender in politics." Annu. Rev. Sociol. 33.1 (2007): 263-284;
[14] Art. 95.III “Poseer el día de la publicación de la convocatoria señalada en la fracción I del artículo 96 de esta Constitución título profesional de licenciado en derecho expedido legalmente, un promedio general de calificación de cuando menos ocho puntos o su equivalente y de nueve puntos o su equivalente en las materias relacionadas con el cargo al que se postula en la licenciatura, especialidad, maestría o doctorado, y práctica profesional de cuando menos cinco años en el ejercicio de la actividad jurídica;”
[15] Art. 95 II: “se deroga”
[16] In the original article 95.VI.2: “Los nombramientos de los Ministros deberán recaer preferentemente entre aquellas personas que hayan servido con eficiencia, capacidad y probidad en la impartición de justicia o que se hayan distinguido por su honorabilidad, competencia y antecedentes profesionales en el ejercicio de la actividad jurídica”
[17] As per article 96.1; 94.8
[18] As per article 96.1.I
[19] As per art. 96.2 “Ministras y Ministros de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, Magistradas y Magistrados de la Sala Superior del Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación e integrantes del Tribunal de Disciplina Judicial”
[20] As per art. 96.3 “Magistradas y Magistrados de Circuito, así como Juezas y Jueces de Distrito”
[21] As per art. 96.1.II.a “”Los Poderes establecerán mecanismos públicos, abiertos, transparentes, inclusivos y accesibles que permitan la participación de todas las personas interesadas que acrediten los requisitos establecidos en esta Constitución y en las leyes, presenten un ensayo de tres cuartillas donde justifiquen los motivos de su postulación y remitan cinco cartas de referencia de sus vecinos, colegas o personas que respalden su idoneidad para desempeñar el cargo”.
[22] “Cada Poder integrará un Comité de Evaluación conformado por cinco personas reconocidas en la actividad jurídica
[23] As per art. 96.1.II. b-c: “Cada Poder integrará un Comité de Evaluación conformado por cinco personas reconocidas en la actividad jurídica, que recibirá los expedientes de las personas aspirantes, evaluará el cumplimiento de los requisitos constitucionales y legales e identificará a las personas mejor evaluadas que cuenten con los conocimientos técnicos necesarios para el desempeño del cargo y se hayan distinguido por su honestidad, buena fama pública, competencia y antecedentes académicos y profesionales en el ejercicio de la actividad jurídica, y “ “Los Comités de Evaluación integrarán un listado de las diez personas mejor evaluadas para cada cargo en los casos de Ministras y Ministros de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, Magistradas y Magistrados de la Sala Superior y salas regionales del Tribunal Electoral e integrantes del Tribunal de Disciplina Judicial, y de las seis personas mejor evaluadas para cada cargo en los casos de Magistradas y Magistrados de Circuito y Juezas y Jueces de Distrito. Posteriormente, depurarán dicho listado mediante insaculación pública para ajustarlo al número de postulaciones para cada cargo, observando la paridad de género. Ajustados los listados, los Comités los remitirán a la autoridad que represente a cada Poder de la Unión para su aprobación y envío al Senado.”
[24] As per art 96.1.IV “El Instituto Nacional Electoral efectuará los cómputos de la elección, publicará los resultados y entregará las constancias de mayoría a las candidaturas que obtengan el mayor número de votos, asignando los cargos alternadamente entre mujeres y hombres. También declarará la validez de la elección y enviará sus resultados a la Sala Superior del Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación o al Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación para el caso de magistraturas electorales, quienes resolverán las impugnaciones antes de que el Senado de la República instale el primer periodo ordinario de sesiones del año de la elección que corresponda, fecha en que las personas aspirantes electas tomarán protesta de su encargo ante dicho órgano legislativo”
[25] As per art. 96.8: “La ley establecerá la forma de las campañas, así como las restricciones y sanciones aplicables a las personas candidatas o servidoras públicas cuyas manifestaciones o propuestas excedan o contravengan los parámetros constitucionales y legales.”
[26] As per article 96.6: “Las personas candidatas tendrán derecho de acceso a radio y televisión de manera igualitaria, conforme a la distribución del tiempo que señale la ley y determine el Instituto Nacional Electoral. Podrán, además, participar en foros de debate organizados por el propio Instituto o en aquellos brindados gratuitamente por el sector público, privado o social en condiciones de equidad.”
[27] As per art 96.7 “Para todos los cargos de elección dentro del Poder Judicial de la Federación estará prohibido el financiamiento público o privado de sus campañas, así como la contratación por sí o por interpósita persona de espacios en radio y televisión o de cualquier otro medio de comunicación para promocionar candidatas y candidatos. Los partidos políticos y las personas servidoras públicas no podrán realizar actos de proselitismo ni posicionarse a favor o en contra de candidatura alguna”
[28] As per article 96.8 “La duración de las campañas para los cargos señalados en el presente artículo será de sesenta días y en ningún caso habrá etapa de precampaña. La ley establecerá la forma de las campañas, así como las restricciones y sanciones aplicables a las personas candidatas o servidoras públicas cuyas manifestaciones o propuestas excedan o contravengan los parámetros constitucionales y legales
[29] Art 99.14-15 ; Art 94.15; and Art 116.2.III.5, 97.1.
[30] https://www.scjn.gob.mx/sites/default/files/agenda/documento/2024-09/reforma-integral-al-sistema-de-justicia-en-mexico.pdf
[31] See in particular: Art 94.3 “La Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación se compondrá de nueve integrantes, Ministras y Ministros, y funcionará en Pleno. Su presidencia se renovará cada dos años de manera rotatoria en función del número de votos que obtenga cada candidatura en la elección respectiva, correspondiendo la presidencia a quienes alcancen mayor votación.”; Art 94.4 “En los términos que la ley disponga las sesiones del Pleno serán públicas”; Art 94.12 “Las razones que justifiquen las decisiones contenidas en las sentencias dictadas por el Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación por mayoría de seis votos serán obligatorias para todas las autoridades jurisdiccionales de la Federación y de las entidades federativas.”; Art. 94.13 “La remuneración que perciban por sus servicios las Ministras y los Ministros de la Suprema Corte, las Magistradas y los Magistrados de Circuito, las Juezas y los Jueces de Distrito, las Magistradas y los Magistrados del Tribunal de Disciplina Judicial, las Magistradas y los Magistrados Electorales y demás personal del Poder Judicial de la Federación, no podrá ser mayor a la establecida para la persona titular de la Presidencia de la República en el presupuesto correspondiente y no será disminuida durante su encargo”; Art 94.14 “Las Ministras y Ministros de la Suprema Corte de Justicia durarán en su encargo doce años y sólo podrán ser removidos del mismo en los términos del Título Cuarto de esta Constitución. […]”
[32] As will I make issue with the reduction of membership and the
[33] See the article published in Reforma on the 19th September, 2024: “Desata Reforma dudas en la SCJN” by Victor Fuentes, Pg. 12.
[34] On September 18th, the Current president of the SCJN Norma Piña opened a consultation procedure to resolve some of these questions. See the article published in Reforma on the 19th September, 2024: “Desata Reforma dudas en la SCJN” by Victor Fuentes, Pg. 12.
[35] The provision Reading as follows “Tratándose de delincuencia organizada, el órgano de administración judicial podrá disponer las medidas necesarias para preservar la seguridad y resguardar la identidad de las personas juzgadoras, conforme al procedimiento que establezca la ley, y”
[36] https://elpais.com/mexico/2024-08-28/los-jueces-sin-rostro-la-nueva-polemica-en-torno-a-la-reforma-judicial-de-lopez-obrador.html
[37] Caso J. Vs. Perú Serie C No. 275, § 184; Caso Pollo Rivera y otros Vs. Perú Serie C No. 319, § 171; Caso Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, Series C No. 69, §§ 127 and 128; and Caso García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Perú, Series C No. 137, § 149.
